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A SURVEY OF THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY:
AN OVERVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
This comment surveys the development of California law concern-
ing the right of publicity. Although its roots are found in the right of
privacy, the right of publicity has become a distinctly different cause of
action which has evolved in a relatively short period of legal history.
This phenomenon suggests that the expansion of the right of publicity
is a response to the growing needs in this century to protect the public
personality.
Whether the status was attained voluntarily or by some incident
deemed newsworthy, the right of privacy previously had not proven to
afford the necessary safeguards nor the appropriate remedies. For this,
the right of publicity is uniquely fashioned. This comment, therefore,
proposes to highlight some of the issues involved: to whom does it ap-
ply; what is the scope of the right; is the right descendible, and if it is
descendible, under what circumstances, and for what duration. The
objective of this comment will be to outline the law concerning the
right of publicity in California, analyze current legal trends and suggest
some guidelines for the future.
A person's right to the use of his name, photograph, or likeness has
long been afforded protection by the courts.' Initially, this right was
called the right of privacy and was intended to prevent injury to a per-
son's feelings, or to protect his "right to be left alone."' Dean Prosser,
in discussing the right of privacy, separated invasions of this right into
four distinct categories.3 His fourth category dealt with those cases in-
volving "[aIppropriation, for the defendant's advantage, of the plain-
1. See Pavesich v. New England Life Ins., Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E.68 (1905); Melvin v.
Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P.91 (1931); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REv. 383, 383-84
(1960) [hereinafter cited as Prosser].
2. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 821, 603 P.2d 425, 430, 160 Cal. Rptr.
323, 328 (1979); Kelly v. Johnson Pub. Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 718, 721, 325 P.2d 659, 661
(1958); see Prosser, supra note 1, at 389.
3. Id., the four categories are:
a. Intrusion upon the plaintiff's seclusion or solitude, or into his private affairs;
b. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff;
c. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye;
d. Appropriation, for the defendant's advantage of the plaintiff's name or like-
ness.
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tiffs name or likeness."4 Gradually, the right of publicity evolved from
this fourth category. It protected a person's right to receive compensa-
tion for the use of his name, photograph or likeness by another.5
Confusion arose when individuals brought actions under the right
of privacy, but sought the protection of the, as yet, unrecognized right
of publicity.6 These individuals were seeking protection of their right
to be compensated for the use of their name, photograph, or likeness
without their permission; the right of privacy was only intended to pro-
tect a person from emotional injuries caused by this unconsented tak-
ing.
The right of publicity evolved when well-known people were
found without a remedy in the right of privacy.7 In most cases, the
courts determined that these individuals lost their right of privacy when
they voluntarily entered the public spotlight. While they were deemed
no longer to have the protection of the right of privacy, equity de-
manded a remedy be fashioned to compensate for injury and the un-
lawful taking of their right of publicity.' The courts then reasoned that
placement in the public eye granted these individuals a monetary value
in their name, photograph or likeness; this value arose from the good-
will which was created by the public's recognition of the individual.9
"A name is commercially valuable as an endorsement of a product'" or
for financial gain only because the public recognizes it and attributes
goodwill and feats of skill or accomplishments of one sort or another to
that personality."" To protect this commercial value, the courts recog-
nized the right of publicity to compensate the plaintiff, not for injury to
his feelings, but for this unconsented taking; or misappropriation.
"The rationale for [protecting the right of publicity] is the straightfor-
ward one of preventing unjust enrichment by the theft of goodwill [in-
herently belonging to the individual seeking protection.]. . . No social
4. Id.
5. Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 843 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); Lugosi, 25
Cal.3d at 818-19, 603 P.2d at 428-29, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326-27; Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard
Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562, 566 (1976).
6. Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality, and History, 55 Nw. U.L.
REV. 553, 554-56 (1960) [hereinafter cited as Gordon).
7. Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1279-81 (D. Minn. 1970); see Ettore v.
Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 486-87 (3d Cir. 1956).
8. See Ettore, 229 F.2d at 486-87 and Price, 400 F. Supp. at 843-44.
9. Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.
1953); Price, 400 F. Supp. at 846-47 [quoting Gordon, supra note 6, at 607 (1960)].
10. Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821, 824 n.10 (9th Cir.




purpose is served by having the defendant get free some aspect of the
plaintiff that would have market value and for which he would nor-
mally pay."12 The fact that the manner in which the plaintiffs name,
photograph, or likeness was used, was not derogatory or deleterious
does not defeat his cause of action.'
3
II. THE UNCONSENTED TAKING OF ONE'S NAME, PHOTOGRAPH, OR
LIKENESS HAS STATUTORY PROTECTION IN CALIFORNIA
Since 1972, California Civil Code section 334414 has protected an
individual from the unconsented taking of his name, photograph, or
likeness. This statute was influenced greatly by a New York statute'5
which made it "both a misdemeanor and a tort to make use of the
name, portrait or picture of any person for 'advertising purposes or for
the purpose of trade' without his written consent."' 6 Thus far, how-
ever, section 334417 has received little attention by the California
courts.
Like the New York statute, the California statute applies to any
person whose name, photograph, or likeness was appropriated without
their consent.' 8 For a cause of action to arise under the statue, the
defendant must have knowingly made the appropriation "for a com-
mercial purpose."' 9 Subsection (g) of the statute states that any reme-
dies the statute provides for, are to be in addition to other legal
remedies.2" This would seem to indicate that an equitable cause of ac-
tion for an unconsented appropriation can still be maintained in con-
junction with, or separate from, this statutory cause of action. Thus,
although this cause of action is more difficult to bring because of the
knowledge requirement, it has the advantage of providing for a mini-
mum recovery of $300.00.21 There is a possibility that, as with other
tort actions, "[p]unitive damages are allowed on finding by the trial
12. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576 [citing Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and
Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROB. 326, 331 (1966)].
13. See generally, Haelan Laboratories, 202 F.2d 866; Lugosi, 25 Cal.3d 813, 603 P.2d
423, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323; Price, 400 F. Supp. 836; Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d
215 (2d Cir. 1978).
14. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1980).
15. 1903 N.Y. Laws, ch. 132, §§ 1-2, as amended in 1921, now N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW
§§ 50-51.
16. Prosser, supra note 1, at 385.
17. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West Supp. 1980).
18. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West Supp. 1980).
19. Id.
20. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(g) (West Supp. 1980).
21. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West Supp. 1980).
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court that the defendant acted with fraud,. . . malice, or oppres-
sion."" As yet, punitive damages have not found significant use in the
courts. Perhaps future actions will more effectively utilize this tool to
deter potential defendants.
III. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY APPLIES TO PUBLIC FIGURES
As a result of the rationale underlying the right of publicity, courts
have limited the right to those individuals who have a commercial
value in their name, photograph or likeness. This commercial value is
an inherent part of being a public figure.23 The right of publicity "usu-
ally becomes important only when the plaintiff. . .has achieved in
some degree a celebrated status."24 However, this right has been lim-
ited somewhat and held not to apply to corporations, partnerships or
animals.2'
Motschenbacher v. J Reynolds Tobacco Co.26 involved the un-
consented use of a public figure's photograph for advertising purposes.
The advertisement depicted the plaintiff in his race car; and despite
alterations of the photograph by the defendant the court found that it
was still recognizable as that of the plaintiff. 7 The court held that Cal-
ifornia recognizes an individual has a legally protected interest in his
own identity. 28
California's "right of publicity" doctrine evolved from several
cases decided in other jurisdictions. The first case to use the name
"right of publicity," thus differentiating a person's commercial interest
in his own identity from his right of privacy, was Haelan Laboratories,
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc. 29
22. Note, CommercialAppropriation ofAn Individual's Name, Photograph or Likeness: 4
New Remedyfor Californians, 3 PAC. L.J. 651, 662 (1972); see also Weinstein, Commercial
Appropriation ofName or Likeness: Section 3344 and the Common Law, 52 L.A.B.J. 430,456
(1977). For detailed analysis of the statute, see those two articles.
23. See note 5 supra.
24. Weinstein, Commercial Appropriation of Name or Likeness: Section 3344 and the
Common Law, 52 L.A.B.J. 430, 446-47 (1977) offers a good example.
If a famous actor received an Academy Award for appearing in John Doe's movie
and John puts the actor's acceptance speech into his advertisement for his new
picture, which the actor doesn't appear in, then the acceptance speech is being used
for commercial purposes and not as news. Therefore, the actor may bring an ac-
tion for invasion of his right of publicity.
25. Price, 400 F. Supp. at 846-47 (quoting Gordon, Right of Property in Name, Likeness,
Personality, and History, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 553, 607 (1960)).
26. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974).
27. Id. at 826-27.
28. Id. at 825.
29. 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir. 1953).
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In Haelan, a chewing gum company which had been granted an
exclusive right to use a baseball player's photograph on its baseball
cards, sued another chewing gum manufacturer that subsequently used
the same baseball player's photograph on its baseball cards. The court
held that "in addition to, independant of that right of privacy, a man
has a right in the publicity value of his photograph, i.e., the right to
grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture. "3  The signifi-
cance of this recognition of a relatively new cause of action may be that
it provides greater control for the individual. It grants individuals the
power to convey their publicity value to those they wish and deny that
same value to others.
IV. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY APPLIES TO NEWSWORTHY PEOPLE
WHOSE NAMES, PHOTOGRAPHS, OR LIKENESS WERE USED
FOR A COMMERCIAL PURPOSE WITHOUT THEIR
CONSENT
Closely related to the concept of a "public figure" is the concept of
"newsworthiness." If an event is "newsworthy" the person involved in
that event becomes similar to a "public figure" in that he loses his right
of privacy with regard to those facts which have been disclosed regard-
ing the incident.31 An understanding of "newsworthiness" helps in a
determination of whether there is a cause of action for an invasion of
the "right of publicity." If a person has given up his "right of pri-
vacy" 32 with regard to a specific event, then the disclosed facts of that
event and the person enter the public domain and can be used by any-
one.33 When the incidents of a life are so public as to be spread upon a
public record they come within the knowledge and into the possession
of the public and cease to be private. 34 In California, the criteria used
to determine if an incident is "newsworthy" are: (1) The social value of
the facts published; (2) The depth of the article's intrusion into ostensi-
bly private affairs; and (3) The extent to which the party voluntarily
acceded to the position of public notoriety. 35
30. Id.
31. See Coverstone v. Davis, 38 Cal. 2d 315, 323,239 P.2d 876, 880-81 (1952) and Smith
v. Nat'l Broadcasting Corp., 138 Cal. App. 2d 807, 811-12, 292 P.2d 600, 603-04 (1956).
32. Ettore, 229 F.2d at 486-87.
33. Coverstone,.38 Cal. 2d at 323, 239 P.2d at 880-81.
34. Melvin, 112 Cal. App. at 290-91, 297 P. at 93; see Smith, 138 Cal. App. 2d at 811-12;
292 P.2d at 603-04, Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 230, 253 P.2d 441, 443 (1953).
35. Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 43 Cal. App. 3d 880, 891, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 370, 378-79 (1974); Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, Inc., 4 Cal. 3d 529, 541, 483 P.2d
34, 43, 93 Cal. Rptr. 866, 875 (1971) [citing Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 36, 459 P.2d
1981]
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In an examination of a situation involving an unconsented taking
of a "newsworthy" person's name, photograph or likeness it is impor-
tant to determine whether it was used for a commerical purpose.
36
In Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc. ,37 Johnson found
$240,000 in cash and then received a $10,000 reward for returning the
money. A magazine article, recounting the incident, was republished in
an English textbook. The plaintiff brought an action for the invasion of
his right of privacy based on the defendant's use of the plaintiffs name
for a commercial purpose. The court held that the plaintiff had failed
to state a cause of action because the author had only used the article as
an illustration of poor grammar. The court also found the article to be
an insubstantial motivation behind student purchases of the book.38
Thus, the court required that a direct connection or nexus be shown
between the use of the name, photograph or likeness and the commer-
cial use.39
In Ellore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp. ,40 the plaintiff, a
professional boxer, fought Joe Louis and was paid a fee for granting
the motion picture rights to the fight. In ruling for the plaintiff, the
court found that, at the time the contract was entered into, neither party
had contemplated the existence of commercial television. Although the
court did not call the right involved, the "right of publicity," it clearly
distinguished between the "right of privacy" which applies to private
persons, and that right which applies to public figures.4
They are fundamentally dissimilar rights: the former arises when
an event involving an average person becomes known to the public,
"and makes him arguably, newsworthy."42 A private person does not
obtain a right of publicity merely by his involvement in a newsworthy
inident, nor does he forego all rights to privacy. The criteria outlined
by the court suggest that private or undisclosed facts may still be pro-
tectible. The determining factor as to whether a right of publicity exists
is whether the person's name, photograph or likeness is used for a com-
mercial purpose.43
912, 922, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360, 370 (1969)]; see Gill v. Curtis Pub. Co., 38 Cal. 2d 273, 278-79,
239 P.2d 630, 634 (1952).
36. See note 23 supra.
37. 43 Cal. App. 3d 880, 118 Cal. Rptr. 370 (1974).
38. Id. at 895, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 381 (emphasis added).
39. Id., CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344(e) (West Supp. 1980).
40. 229 F.2d 481 (3d Cir. 1956).
41. Id. at 486.
42. d.
43. Johnson, 43 Cal. App. 3d 880, 118 Cal. Rptr. 370.
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This latter right of publicity "involves the appropriation of the
performance or production of a professional performer."" Here, the
person involved is a public figure and, as such, has a right of publicity.
This right only extends to appropriations of his name, photograph or
likeness when it is used for a commercial purpose or when the appro-
priation involves the taking of his entire act or performance. 5
The First Amendment of the United States Constitution has been
held to allow the press to publish or broadcast matters of public interest
or concern. 6 In Zacchini v. Scrops-Howard Broadcasting Co., the
United States Supreme Court stated that where these First Amendment
rights conflict with the right of publicity, the courts must weigh the
effects of enforcing one right over the other.47 The Zacchini case in-
volved an entertainer, Hugo Zacchini, who performed a "human can-
nonball" act. Against his request, a television newsreporter filmed
Zacchini's act and showed it on the news. Zacchini sued for unlawful
appropriation and the United States Supreme Court held that Zacchini
had a "right of publicity" in his act and the defendants had violated
this right by televising the entire act without his consent. 8 This ad hoc
balancing test clearly favored a recovery for the plaintiff but may not
provide a similar remedy when the facts are less one-sided. It also
leaves open the issue of just how much could effectively be appropri-
ated in the interest of news dissemination.
It is important to note that the court specifically stated that it was
only deciding the First and Fourteenth Amendment issues.49 It left the
question of whether there was a privileged invasion of Zacchini's right
of publicity to the state court because Zacchini's right was based on
Ohio law.50 This indicates that each state may have its own require-
ments for a right of publicity cause of action. In response to this sug-
gestion, state legislatures have enacted New York Civil Rights Law,
sections 50-51, and California Civil Code, section 3344.11
V. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY IN CALIFORNIA MAY BE
DESCENDIBLE IF EXERCISED DURING ONE'S LIFE
A major question involving the right of publicity is whether an
44. Ettore, 229 F.2d at 486.
45. Id.; Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 565-68.
46. Zacchini, 433 U.S. 562.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 573, 575-78.
49. Id. at 566-68.
50. Id.
51. See notes 14 and 16 supra.
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assignment of this right, made while a performer is alive, will survive
beyond his death. The most important California case to address this
issue was Lugosi v. Universal Pictures.52 Lugosi involved Bela Lugosi's
widow and son bringing an action against Universal Pictures for alleg-
edly appropriating property which they had inherited from the de-
ceased. Universal had been using Bela Lugosi's portrayal of Dracula to
advertise other Dracula films in which Lugosi did not appear. The
California Supreme Court found that Lugosi had never exercised his
right by exploiting his name and likeness in association with the
Dracula character.5 3 The court stated that Lugosi could have brought
the action himself, had he been alive, and suggested that if he had exer-
cised his right by using his representation of Dracula to advertise him-
self or a business, then he may have been able to assign his right. 4
Assignment of the right to exploit name and likeness by
the "owner" thereof is synonymous with its exercise. . . .As-
sertion by the heirs of the right to exploit their predecessor's
name and likeness to commercial situations he left unex-
ploited simply is not the exercise of that right by the person
entitled to it.55
The court ruled against the plaintiff because the right to exploit a
"name and likeness is personal to the artist."56 Conceivably the person
entitled to exercise the right of publicity of the deceased may be an
assignee. Thus, whether or not a person has exercised his right of pub-
licity during his lifetime has become the test for determining
descendibility of this right in California. 7
Justice Mosk's concurring opinion in Lugosis8 suggests that Price v.
Hal Roach Studios, Inc. ,51 may be distinguished on the basis that the
actors Laurel and Hardy were representing themselves and developed
their own characters, whereas Bela Lugosi portrayed a character that
52. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
53. Id. at 818-20, 603 P.2d at 428-29, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 326-27.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 823, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329.
56. Id. at 824, 603 P.2d at 431, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 329; see Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg
Productions, 25 Cal. 3d 860, 861, 603 P.2d 454, 455, 160 Cal. Rptr. 352, 353 (1979), in which
Rudolph Valentino's nephew sued for misappropriation of his uncle's right of publicity.
The State Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the action and affirmed the
ruling in Lugosi.
57. Id. See Felcher & Rubin, Privacy, Publicity and the Portrayal ofReal People by the
Media, 88 YALE L.J. 1577, 1618-19 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Felcher & Rubin].
58. Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979)
(Mosk, J., concurring).
59. Id. [citing Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 845 (S.D. N.Y. 1975).]
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Bram Stoker created in his novel Dracula. "Merely playing a role...
creates no inheritable property right in an actor absent a contract so
providing."6 In Price, the court ruled on the basis of sections 50-51 of
the New York Civil Rights Law6 that it is not necessary for a person to
exercise his right of publicity in order to preserve it for one's heirs. 2
Although the California and New York statutes appear similar on their
face, there has been a major distinction in state court application of
them. California, in the absence of direct legislative intent, has refused
to make the right of publicity descendible.
In Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc. ,63 the plaintiff sued the de-
fendant for publishing a memorial poster of Elvis Presley. The plaintiff
had purchased the exclusive right to use Presley's name, photograph or
likeness for commercial purposes. The plaintiff purchased its rights in
several merchandising agreements from Presley's partner and from the
executor of Presley's estate. The defendant purchased the copyright to
a photograph from a photographer and used it on a memorial poster.
The court found that Presley's partner had a property right which did
not terminate upon Presley's death." The court also held that the
plaintiff's exclusive right to exploit the Presley name and likeness, be-
cause exercised during Presley's life, survived his death.65 Thus, the
death of Presley did not result in the termination of the exclusive right
to use Presley's name, photograph or likeness which the defendant's
poster had appropriated.66
In opposition to the Second Circuit Court of Appeals decision in
Pro Arts is the Sixth Circuit decision in Memphis Development Founda-
tion v. Factors Etc., Inc. 67 The Memphis Development case involved a
non-profit company that sold miniature statues of Elvis Presley after
his death. As in the Pro Arts case, Factors was trying to enforce what it
claimed to be an exclusive right to Presley's name, photograph or like-
ness. Here, the court held "that the right of publicity should not be
given the status of a devisable right, even where. . .a person exploits
the right by contract during life."'68 Therefore, it was held that Pres-
ley's right of publicity terminated upon his death. These inconsisten-
60. Id.
.61. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1948).
62. Price, 400 F. Supp. at 846.
63. 579 F.2d 215 (2d Cir. 1978).
64. Id. at 220-22.
65. Id. at 222.
66. Id. at 220-22.
67. 616 F.2d 956 (6th Cir. 1980).
68. Id. at 958.
1981]
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cies, should they continue, may require a final determination by the
United States Supreme Court or action by Federal legislation.69
VI. THE RIGHT OF PUBLICITY IS ANALOGOUS TO COPYRIGHT LAW
AND, AS SUCH, SHOULD BE DESCENDIBLE FOR
A LIMITED PERIOD-
When analyzing right of publicity cases, more and more courts re-
fer to this right as a property right."0 The right of publicity seems to be
a property right in the same way in which copyrights are property.7'
This analogy naturally arises because the policies underlying copyright
law and the right of publicity are the same. This policy is that "encour-
agement of individual effort by personal gain is the best way to ad-
vance public welfare,"72 or in other words, "the right of the individual
to reap the reward of his endeavors."73 Copyright also bears a similar-
ity to the right of publicity in its potential conflicts with the First
Amendment.74 Though information should be readily accessible both
to the press and the public, it should not infringe on the property rights
of an individual who has obtained commercial value in his name, pho-
tograph or likeness.
Copyright laws protect an individual's creative efforts. This pro-
tection allows for the descendibility of the copyright to the creator's
heirs, or for its assignability or copyright sale to a third person. While
the copyright is in effect, it is the "property" of the owner; thus, he
holds all of the property rights and benefits. It is readily apparent that
this type of system would lend itself equally well to the right of public-
ity.75
An individual works to create a proprietary interest in his name or
likeness just as an author labors over his creative efforts. The author
achieves statutory copyright protection by fixing his work in a tangible
form. This is similar to the "exercising" of the right of publicity al-
luded to in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures.76 To protect his right of pub-
69. Prior to publication the United States Supreme Court denied a hearing in Memphis
Development.
70. Factors Etc., Inc. v. Pro Arts, Inc., 579 F.2d 215, 221; Price, 400 F. Supp. at 844.
71. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 573, 576; Lugosi, 25 Cal. 3d at 846-47, 603 P.2d at 446-47, 160
Cal. Rptr. at 344-45; see also Felcher & Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is
There Commercial Life After Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125, 1129-32 (1980).
72. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576 citing Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201. 219 (1954).
73. Id. at 573.
74. Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 576.
75. Id. at 575.
76. 25 Cal. 3d 813, 603 P.2d 425, 160 Cal. Rptr. 323 (1979).
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licity, its owner must go to some lengths to "exercise" it. If not
"exercised," the right dies with the owner; if "exercised," it may be
descendible in California.
In Lugosi, the California Supreme Court expressed an unwilling-
ness to determine the extent of any such descendibility."" The court
suggested that it would be, "beyond the scope of judicial authority" to
make a determination and further suggested that the legislature, if it so
desired, might appropriately amend California Civil Code, section
3344.78 Thus far, the legislature has declined to do so.
Chief Justice Rose Bird, in her dissent in Lugosi, suggested that
the court follow the copyright analogy and adopt the rule that "the
right of publicity should be recognized during the subject's life and for
fifty years thereafter."79 Whether it be by judicial or legislative enact-
ment, the best course for the future may be to use this copyright anal-
ogy when dealing with the right of publicity.80
VII. CONCLUSION
The right of publicity is still in its early stages of development. It
has been held to apply to both "public figures" 8 I and to "newsworthy"
individuals.82 As yet, no California court has held the right of publicity
to be descendible; however, in Lugosi, the California Supreme Court
suggested that the right may be descendible if exercised during one's
lifetime.83 Thus, the court failed to extend the right of publicity by its
own action and deferred to the Legislature for further clarification.
8 4
There has been no clear guide for when a person is deemed to have
"exercised" the right-is it only by assignment in contract or may he
personally exercise the right of publicity sufficient to meet the "exer-
cise" standard? Many questions remain unanswered.
In her dissent in Lugosi, Chief Justice Bird advocates the court's
adoption of a copyright analogy but this has not been actively pursued
by the State Legislature.8 5 The U.S. Supreme Court previously sup-
ported this approach in Zacehini but deference to the state court for
final determination has resulted in the inconsistencies noted in the Cir-
77. Id. at 822, 603 P.2d at 430, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 344-45.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 847, 603 P.2d at 446-47, 160 Cal. Rptr. at 344-45.
80. Accord, Felcher & Rubin, supra note 64.
81. See notes 22-29 supra.
82. See notes 30-38 supra.
83. See note 56 supra.
84. See notes 75 and 76 supra.
85. See note 77 supra.
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cuit Court decisions.86
Clearly, the right of publicity is an area which requires further
guidelines and some effort to create unanimity. When decisions neces-
sarily affect public figures who are regionally or nationally known and
whose property rights are not central to one jurisdiction, there is a de-
sire to achieve uniformity when affecting those rights. The answer may
lie in a further determination by the United States Supreme Court or
action by the Congress.
The future form of the right of publicity in California is unsettled
and the California Civil Code, section 3344,s7 has not been the solution
one would hope to derive from legislative activism. One can only be
certain that this is an area of law requiring further development for the
protection of individuals caught in a twentieth century phenomenon-
the media.
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